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In this article I offer an overture to further discussions about the 
relationship between the German critical theorist, Axel Honneth, and the 
French philosopher of dialogue, Paul Ricoeur, specifically on their insights 
on the ethics of recognition. First, I define critical theory through the three 
normative resources suggested by Max Horkheimer in order to 
contextualize my reading of Honneth and Ricoeur, both of whom adhere 
to the politico-practical content of critical theory. Second, I briefly outline 
the Honneth–Ricoeur debate/dialogue in order to show the philosophical 
link between them. Third, in separate sections, I schematically discuss the 
basic features of their individual ethics of recognition in order to show 
the context of the idea of “struggle” and “peaceful dialogue.” Fourth, I 
present my critical comments on Ricoeur’s critique of Honneth. While I 
appreciate Ricoeur’s proposal for peaceful experiences of mutual 
recognition, I do think that his wariness of the Hegel–Honneth position 
on the normativity of struggle is not founded on convincing grounds.   
Key terms Honneth, Ricoeur, critical theory, mutual recognition, struggle, 
peaceful dialogue 
 Budhi: A Journal of Ideas and Culture 20.2 (2016): 85–117. 




The Normative Claims of Critical Theory 
 good theoretical starting point for making sense of social 
recognition is by revisiting the basic normative claims of critical 
theory, specifically critical theory as originally conceived by Max 
Horkheimer in the 1930s. Firstly, critical theory presupposes that 
reality is necessarily social. What this presupposition means is that the 
environment we inhabit is largely a product of human intervention. 
Through philosophy, science, technology, and others, we produce our 
own “historical way of life in its totality.”1 Critical theory, therefore, 
perceives our social normative practices immanently within the social 
structures we have invented that supposedly promote social cohesion. 
Secondly, the practical goal of critical theory is the emancipation from 
slavery and the abolition of social injustice.2 This presupposition is 
based on a kind of pre-political assumption that at the core of every 
human being is the interest to be free, a kind of “quasi-transcendental 
interest.”3 It is not necessary to conceive of this quasi-transcendental 
interest in essentialist terms; at best, it is a practical assumption, yet an 
assumption that runs all across various cultural groups. The third 
normative presupposition of critical theory is that the emancipatory 
impulse is not confined to proletarian sensibilities. This entails the 
decentralization of the role of the proletariat and the recognition of 
the emancipatory potential of any social group informed by a pre-
political demand for social freedom.4 
 
1 Max Horkheimer, Critical Theory: Selected Essays, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell et al. (New York: 
Continuum, 1989), 244. 
2 See ibid., 242–46. 
3
 Axel Honneth, “Recognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice,” Acta 
Sociologica 47, no. 4 (December 2004): 354. Honneth, of course, only borrowed the idea of the 
“quasi-transcendental interest” from Habermas, specifically from Knowledge and Human Interests, 
trans. Jeremy J. Shapiro (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), 194–95. 
4 Elsewhere I have outlined these three normative claims of critical theory in detail, see my 
“What is Critical Theory? Max Horkheimer and the Makings of the Frankfurt School Tradition,” 
Mabini Review 2, no. 1 (2013): 1–19. 
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My position is that a critical theory of society, even beyond that 
of the Frankfurt School tradition, presupposes all three assumptions 
above. However, I take as the strongest normative claim the second: 
emancipation from slavery and the abolition of social injustice. I 
believe that this is the normative core of critical theory, as it 
provides the central qualitative dynamo of social critique. In other 
words, as a politico-practical content of social critique, what it 
articulates is the pre-political anthropological propensity toward 
“freedom” and “justice.” 
The Honneth–Ricoeur Debate/Dialogue 
In bringing Axel Honneth and Paul Ricoeur together to 
debate/dialogue about social recognition,5 my basic assumption is 
that both adhere to the politico-practical content of critical theory. It 
is not at all difficult to show that Honneth adheres to the second 
normative claim of critical theory, for freedom and justice are central 
 
5 Mine is, of course, not the first attempt to compare the notions of recognition of Honneth 
and Ricoeur.  In the journal Etudes Ricoeuriennes/Ricoeur Studies, for example, one whole issue is 
devoted to reactions to Ricoeur’s work on recognition; specifically, the journal issue features two 
essays that compare the recognition-theoretical models of Honneth and Ricoeur by Marianne 
Moyaert and Gonçalo Marcelo. It must be mentioned that both essays are critical of Honneth’s 
version of recognition and purport to remedy the deficiencies of the same by arguing, respectively, 
that Ricoeur offers a theory of narrativity that supplements the struggles for recognition of 
minority groups (Moyaert) and that these struggles for recognition need not be “politicized” but, 
rather, are motivated by a “pure ethics of recognition” (Marcelo). See Marianne Moyaert, 
“Between Ideology and Utopia: Honneth and Ricoeur on Symbolic Violence, Marginalization and 
Recognition,” in Etudes Ricoeuriennes/Ricoeur Studies 2, no. 1 (2011): 84–109, http://ricoeur.pitt.edu/ 
ojs/index.php/ricoeur/article/view/49/26; and Gonçalo Marcelo, “Paul Ricœur’s Utopia of 
Mutual Recognition,” in ibid., 110–33, http://ricoeur.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/ricoeur/article/ 
view/69/20. Also worthy of mention are the various engagements in the book anthology From 
Ricoeur to Action: The Socio-Political Significance of Ricoeur’s Thinking, ed. Todd S. Mei and David Lewin 
(London: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2012), especially chaps. 5, 6, and 10. 
Moreover, the following essays are also worth mentioning: Alain Loute, “Philosophie sociale at 
reconnaissance mutuelle chez Paul Ricoeur,” in Affectivité, imaginaire, création sociale, ed. R. Gély and 
L. Van Eynde (Bruxelles: Facultés universitaires Saint-Louis, 2010), 125–47 and Michael Sohn, 
“The Ethics and Politics of Recognition: Reflections on Taylor, Honneth, and Ricoeur,” Eco-Ethica 
4 (2015): 217–26.      




themes in his system of thought. 6  Perhaps the most elucidating 
discussion about freedom and justice done by Honneth is found in 
his most recent book, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundation of 
Democratic Life, where he enacts a Hegelian conception of freedom 
and justice based on the idea of Sittlichkeit or ethical life. Borrowing 
from Hegel, specifically from The Philosophy of Right,7 Honneth uses 
the triadic constitutive elements of ethical life, namely, family, civil 
society, and the state in order to present an idea of social freedom, 
which he then attempts to reconcile with his own recognition 
theory. Basically, what Honneth wishes to evince, via the Hegelian 
idea of the ethical life, is a theory of justice that is grounded in a 
politics of emancipation informed by the normativity of social 
intersubjective relations.8 However, just to backtrack a bit, Honneth’s 
work on recognition has gained prominence in the last couple of 
decades, especially after the publication of Kampf um Anerkennung 
(The Struggle for Recognition) in 1992, wherein he sketched his basic 
theory of recognition by marrying basic ideas from the works of the 
young Hegel and the social psychology of George Herbert Mead.  
Meanwhile, the same cannot be said about the reception of 
Ricoeur’s recognition theory since Ricoeur scholarship is largely 
devoted to his theory of narrativity and hermeneutics. Although, 
very recently, commentators have started to pick up on Ricoeur’s  
contribution to social and political philosophy, in general, and the 
 
6 A good introduction to the relationship between recognition and justice in Honneth’s work 
is Renante Pilapil’s “Psychologization of Injustice? On Axel Honneth’s Theory of Recognitive 
Justice,” Ethical Perspectives 18, no. 1 (2011): 79–106.  
7  See G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H. B. Nisbet (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), especially §§141–157, where Hegel discusses the transition 
from morality to the ethical life of the community. 
8  See Axel Honneth, Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life, trans. Joseph 
Ganahl (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2014). For a more succinct account of the interplay between 
justice and injustice, see Honneth, “Recognition and Justice,” 351–64. 




ethics of recognition, in particular.9 This is perhaps due to the fact 
that Ricoeur only began to explicitly use the term “recognition” 
during the last ten years of his career, specifically in his last 
published work Parcours de la Reconaissance (The Course of Recognition 
2004). In outlining Ricoeur’s basic insights on the relationship 
between recognition and justice, The Course of Recognition is 
undeniably the main source, albeit commentaries on this work are 
quite scarce. Charles Reagan’s recent commentary on The Course of 
Recognition underscores the inextricable relationship between 
recognition and justice: recognition normatively informs justice 
inasmuch as justice is the telos of recognition. 10  With Reagan’s 
assumptions, I am more confident about my reading of Ricoeur’s  
ethics of recognition as compatible with the politico-practical  
 
 
9 For example, see the essays in Mei and Lewin eds., From Ricoeur to Action: The Socio-Political 
Significance of Ricoeur’s Thinking; and Greg S. Johnson and Dan R. Stiver, eds., Paul Ricoeur and the 
Task of Political Philosophy (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2013). For recent commentaries on Ricoeur’s 
ethics of recognition, see Loute, “Philosophie sociale at reconnaissance mutuelle chez Paul 
Ricoeur”; Michael Sohn, The Good of Recognition: Phenomenology, Ethics, and Religion in the Thought of 
Levinas and Ricoeur (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2014); Sohn, “The Ethics and Politics of 
Recognition: Reflections on Taylor, Honneth, and Ricoeur”; David M. Kaplan, Ricoeur’s Critical 
Theory (New York: State University of New York Press, 2003), 154–64; Alain Loute, “The Gift and 
Mutual Recognition: Paul Ricoeur as a Reader of Marcel Hénaff,” in Paul Ricoeur and the Task of 
Political Philosophy, 105–24; L. Sebastian Purcell, “The Course of Racial Recognition: A Ricoeurian 
Approach to Critical Race Theory,” in From Ricoeur to Action, 75–95; Scott Davidson, “The Long 
Road to Recognition: Paul Ricoeur and Bell Hooks on the Development of Self-Esteem,” in ibid., 
96–112; and Christopher Lauer, “States of Peace: Ricoeur and the Gift,” in ibid., 175–94; Jean 
Greisch, “Toward Which Recognition?,” in A Passion for the Possible: Thinking with Paul Ricoeur, ed. 
by Brian Treanor and Henry Isaac Venema (New York: Fordham University Press, 2010), 90–111. 
A good number of commentaries in Etudes Ricoeuriennes/Ricoeur Studies are worth mentioning: Jean-
Luc Amalric, Arto Laitinen, L. Sebastian Purcell, Silvia Pierosara, Marianne Moyaert, Gonçalo 
Marcelo, and Emmanuel Renault, 2:1 (2011), http://ricoeur.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/ricoeur/ 
issue/view/3; Beatriz Contreras Tasso, Sébastien Roman, Robert Vosloo, Charles Reagan 6, no. 2 
(2015), http://ricoeur.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/ricoeur/issue/view/13. 
10 See Charles Reagan, “Recognition and Justice,” Etudes Ricoeuriennes/Ricoeur Studies 6, no. 2 
(2015): 118–29, http://ricoeur.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/ricoeur/article/view/276/157. Similar 
accounts are given in Beatriz Contreras Tasso’s “Connaissance de soi et reconnaissance. Bases 
éthico-anthropologiques de la justice dans la pensée ricœurienne” and Roman’s “Justice sociale et 
luttes pour la reconnaissance: la question de l’agapè,” in ibid., 68–87 and 88–104, 
http://ricoeur.pitt.edu/ojs/index.php/ricoeur/article/view/301/154 and http://ricoeur.pitt.edu/ 
ojs/index.php/ricoeur/article/view/300/155. 




content of critical theory. In addition to The Course of Recognition, one 
may reconstruct Ricoeur’s own theory of recognition from two 
other works, namely, Critique and Conviction (1997) which is a 
collection of conversations with François Azouvi and Marc de 
Launay,11 and Ricoeur’s acceptance speech for the 2004 Kluge Prize 
in the Humanities, “Asserting Personal Capacities and Pleading for 
Mutual Recognition.”12 Nonetheless, it is important to point out that 
in The Course of Recognition Ricoeur directly engages with Honneth, 
specifically on the latter’s “systematic renewal” of the Hegelian notion 
of Anerkennung (recognition).13 It is important to note, moreover, that 
Ricoeur’s basic reconceptualization of the ethics of recognition is 
profoundly influenced by Honneth’s The Struggle for Recognition, from 
which the former reconstructs a basic methodological framework 
for the idea of recognition. Ricoeur commences his dialogue with 
Honneth by using the latter’s interpretation of Anerkennung in order 
to criticize the Hegelian position—more specifically, Hegel’s 
emphasis on the dialectical aspect, and in Riceour’s estimation of 
violent struggle, of recognition in Hegel’s Jena writings. In contrast to 
the Hegel–Honneth position, Ricoeur favors a notion of recognition 
that does not exclusively emphasize the idea of struggle as a 
normative basis. Rather, Ricoeur wishes to “search for more 
peaceful experiences of recognition.”14 Nevertheless, Ricoeur gives 
due credence to Honneth’s Hegelian-inspired recognition theory, 
even providing us with one of the most illuminating and convincing  
 
 
11 Paul Ricoeur, Critique and Conviction, trans. Kathleen Blamey (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1998). 
12 Paul Ricoeur, “Asserting Personal Capacities and Pleading for Mutual Recognition,” in A 
Passion for the Possible: Thinking with Paul Ricoeur, ed. Brian Treanor and Henry Isaac Venema, 22–26. 
(New York: Fordham University Press, 2010). 
13 See Paul Ricoeur, The Course of Recognition, trans. David Pellauer (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2005), 186. 
14 Ibid.  




reconstruction of the three spheres of recognition; emphasizing, 
furthermore, that Honneth’s appropriation of the three spheres of 
recognition and their corresponding forms of misrecognition provide 
both speculative and empirical bases for the philosophical study of 
recognition as a kind of struggle. 15  Nevertheless, despite this 
acknowledgment, Ricoeur identifies a deficiency in Honneth’s 
theoretical position, a deficiency that the latter inherited from Hegel, 
specifically the emphasis that recognition is a kind of struggle or 
conflict: “Does not the claim for affective, juridical, and social 
recognition, through its militant, conflictual style, end up as an 
indefinite demand, a kind of ‘bad infinity’?”16 In other words, Ricoeur 
worries that the Hegel–Honneth conception of recognition as 
struggle, where recognition is construed as an “interminable” struggle 
that may never end up anywhere, may just result in a vicious cycle, 
creating a new form of “unhappy consciousness.”17 Ricoeur writes: 
“This question has to do not only with the negative feelings that go 
with a lack of recognition, but also with the acquired abilities, thereby 
handed over to an insatiable quest. The temptation here is a new form 
of the ‘unhappy consciousness,’ as either an incurable sense of  
victimization or the indefatigable postulation of unattainable ideals.”18  
 
 
15 Cf. ibid., 187–88. 
16 Ibid., 218. 
17 The “unhappy consciousness” is a metaphor used by Hegel in the Phenomenology of Spirit to 
describe the third phase in the understanding of self-consciousness, the first two being “stoicism” 
and “skepticism.” For Hegel, each moment in the development of self-consciousness is an 
instance of awareness of individual freedom, albeit pathological on account of their inadequate 
appreciation of social reality.  For instance, the unhappy consciousness, in the Phenomenology, is 
depicted as the hybridization of the stoic and the skeptic positions—it is both delusory and evasive.  
The unhappy consciousness “… knows that it is the dual consciousness of itself, as self-liberating, 
unchangeable, and self-identical, and as bewildering and self-perverting, and it is the awareness of 
this self-contradictory nature itself.” G. W. F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1977), §206. For a more elaborate account of the 
pathological moments of freedom in the Phenomenology, see my “Hegel and Pathologies of 
Freedom,” Cogito: Journal of Philosophy 4, no. 1 (New Series 2006): 37–43. 
18 Ricoeur, Course of Recognition, 218. 




In plainer words, Ricoeur is wary of both the damaging effect of 
misrecognition and the equally damaging consequences of a sense of 
entitlement on the part of the misrecognized. This pathological sense of 
entitlement, for Ricoeur, could become an endless lust and fascination 
for “power” and “violence.”19  Therefore, in order to avoid the 
insatiability of the new unhappy consciousness, Ricoeur suggests an 
alternative to the idea of struggle: “The alternative to the idea of 
struggle in the process of mutual recognition is to be sought in 
peaceful experiences of mutual recognition, based on symbolic 
mediations as exempt from the juridical as from the commercial order 
of exchange.”20 I shall return to the idea of “peaceful experiences of 
mutual recognition” later.  
What I wish to do in the following sections is quite 
straightforward: to present an overture to the similar, yet also 
different, theories of recognition of Honneth and Ricoeur. What I 
seek is a middle ground between the two positions, that is to say, 
between standpoints of “struggle” and “peaceful dialogue.” While I 
express my appreciation for Ricoeur’s proposal for peaceful 
experiences of mutual recognition, I do think that his wariness of 
the Hegel–Honneth position on the normativity of struggle is not 
founded on convincing grounds. My presentation is, hopefully, 
straightforward enough as I present the basic features of each theory 
of recognition. A caution must be made, however, for my 
reconstruction will just be very schematic. First, I begin with  




19 Ibid., 246.  
20 Ibid., 219. To my mind, Ricoeur is recommending something quite similar to the Habermasian 
notion of the “ideal speech situation”: “. . . we have to turn to days of truce, clear days, what we 
might call clearings, where the meaning of action emerges from the fog of doubt bearing the mark 
of ‘fitting action’.” Ibid., 218.  




self-preservation to the struggle for recognition—which, for 
Honneth, is the shift from a purely subjectivist to an intersubjectivist 
conception of the ethical community.  Second, this intersubjectivist 
presupposition is the normative basis of Honneth’s ethics of 
recognition, as he emphasizes the material dimension of human 
ethical bonds. Honneth, then, is able to speak about the pathological 
nature of “misrecognition” or “injustice” on this basis. Third, I 
rehearse the three spheres of recognition—care, respect, and self-
esteem—understood by Honneth as normative moments in the 
socialization of an individual; it is in this context that we may 
understand Honneth as propounding a materialist philosophical 
anthropology. Through the realization of these moments a sense of 
social justice becomes open to us, while their distortion becomes the 
basis of social injustice.  
Meanwhile, in my schematic reconstruction of Ricoeur’s ethics of 
recognition, I present three assumptions. First, that recognition is 
the acknowledgment of distinct qualitative differences of individuals 
and cultural groups. Ricoeur suggests that the intersubjective 
reciprocity implied in recognition could better address the problem 
of multiculturalism as opposed to the politics of identity. As such, 
Ricoeur emphasizes the prospect of social cohesion on the basis of 
reciprocity in dialogue. Second, I highlight Ricoeur’s powerful 
theory of narrativity, specifically the normative role of collective 
memory. It is through the normativity of memory that Ricoeur’s 
philosophical anthropology is built upon and, moreover, the idea of 
collective memory allows him to contextualize his notion of the 
reciprocity of dialogical exchange in relation to the phenomenon of 
forgiveness. Third, I return to the idea of peaceful experiences of 
mutual recognition, highlighting Ricoeur’s proposal that “gift-
giving” is a more peaceful means of arriving at mutual recognition, 
as opposed to the violent and insatiable struggle for recognition. 




Before I conclude, I provide a brief section wherein I present my 
critical comments on Ricoeur’s critique of Honneth. 
Honneth and the Struggle for Recognition       
Honneth considers the Jena writings of the young Hegel as the 
starting point for articulating “a social theory with normative 
content” based on the latter’s conception of “a comprehensive 
‘struggle for recognition’.” 21  According to Honneth, Hegel shifts 
from the modern emphasis on the struggle for self-preservation, 
exemplified by the philosophical anthropology of Niccolo 
Machiavelli and Thomas Hobbes, to the struggle for recognition. 
What the struggle for self-preservation entails is that “individual 
subjects and political communities alike oppose one another in a 
state of constant competition over interests.”22 Both Machiavelli and 
Hobbes construe this egocentric struggle for self-preservation to be 
at the core of human nature and, thus, something to be reckoned 
with if the situation entails the conflict between contrasting 
pluralities within society. As such, both philosophers suggest that 
this somewhat grim character of human nature be curbed, regulated, 
or mastered. For Machiavelli, power struggles normatively condition 
the emergence of a single individual (the Prince) who takes control 
over other subjects and that, through this singular source of power, 
the selfish nature of subjects can be redirected in a beneficial way. 
Hobbes, for his part, imagines a Leviathan to whom the subjects’ 
rights of nature are submitted. Giving up an individual’s inclination 




 Axel Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts, trans. Joel 
Anderson (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), 1. 
22 Ibid., 7. 




harmonious society.23 In other words, modern political philosophy’s 
emphasis on an egoistic human nature leads to either a kind of 
political instrumentalism (Machiavelli) or contractualism (Hobbes) 
to justify the state’s role in the forging of social cohesion.24 
Meanwhile, Hegel questions the individualistic dimension of 
modern political philosophy and demonstrates how individual 
autonomy can be gleaned from a philosophical anthropology that 
does not presuppose an atomic notion of the self. Rather, individual 
autonomy results from a dialectical process of identity formation 
that involves the actual intersubjective interactions of humans. Such 
a philosophical anthropology does not presuppose that human 
agency already exists from the very beginning, but, rather, human 
agency is a product of stages of human relations that one goes 
through in a lifetime. Another important aspect of this Hegelian 
reconceptualization of the development of individual autonomy is 
that it goes hand in hand with the dialectical differentiation of 
society.25 In other words, we find in Hegel an attempt to mediate 
“subjective spirit” and “objective spirit,” to be more precise, “the 
conceptual delineation of the different types of human faculties and 
interactions, and their realization in social life, in social, economic, 
legal and political institutions.” 26  What is presupposed in the 
mediation between subjective and objective spirit is that what 
constitute the basic fiber of an ethical community (Sittlichkeit) are the 
reciprocal or recognitive relations that exist among individuals. The 




23 Cf. ibid., 7–10. 
24 See ibid., 7. 
25 Cf. Joel Anderson, “Translator’s Introduction,” in ibid., xix–xx. 
26 Jean-Philippe Deranty, Beyond Communication: A Critical Study of Axel Honneth’s Social Philosophy 
(Leiden: Brill, 2009), 189. 




is where subjects are “fully engaged with each other” in mutual 
recognition,27 a state where what Hegel calls “absolute ethical life”28 
is in place. In contradistinction to the modern assumption that 
society is made up of atomistic subjects with individualistic interests, 
Hegel offers a conceptualization of society where the social 
interaction of individuals is seen as the “common substance in 
which all share and participate.”29 Honneth’s recognition theory has 
been crafted based on this normative claim of Hegel. Honneth 
remarks: “every philosophical theory of society must proceed not 
from the acts of isolated subjects but rather from the framework of 
ethical bonds, within which subjects always already move. Thus, 
contrary to atomistic theories of society, one is to assume, as a kind 
of natural basis for human socialization, a situation in which 
elementary forms of intersubjective coexistence are always 
present.”30 
By emphasizing the material dimension of ethical bonds, that is 
to say, bonds wrought out of concrete social interaction, Honneth is 
able to formulate a theory of recognition grounded in the 
assumption that society, at large, is somewhat an amplification of 
human social connections. At the heart of this theory is Honneth’s 
assumption that there is “always present” a pre-cognitive and pre-
political relation between individuals. “The social bond always 
already unites those who later come to be individualised, and who 
often forget the communal ground underpinning their 




28 See G. W. F. Hegel, The System of Ethical Life and First Philosophy of Spirit, trans. H. S. Harris 
and T. M. Knox (New York: State University of New York Press, 1979), 242. 
29 Deranty, Beyond Communication, 190. 
30 Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 14. 
31 Deranty, Beyond Communication, 193–94. 




interdependence is the basis of individualization. Recognition, in this 
context, is understood as a process that undergirds this communal 
ground and, as such, individualization presupposes our integration 
into a community wherein the interdependence of subjects is a 
fundamental normative element. We are, therefore, not inert 
monads that do not communicate. Rather, our individual personal 
identities are largely constituted by our social interactions—it is not 
who I am that makes me an individual, but, rather, it is who I know that 
makes me who I am. In this context, the experience of social 
alienation or injustice is a pathological forgetfulness of this quasi-
transcendental interest or the forgetfulness of our intersubjective 
coexistence. Whether we like it or not, as members of society, we 
have always been “related prior to any further specified social 
relation.”32 Our failure to realize and accept the “shared” dimension 
of society leads to the pathological experience of misrecognition or 
social injustice.  
According to the Hegelian scholar, Robert Pippin, Hegel’s notion 
of recognition, which as we saw Honneth took as point of 
departure, is an answer to the question of the very possibility of 
freedom.33 This notion brings us back to my earlier assumption that 
a theory of recognition presupposes the second normative claim of 
critical theory: emancipation from slavery and the abolition of social 
injustice. In The Struggle for Recognition, Honneth presents an elaborate 
theoretico-practical solution to the problem of social injustice in 
modern society or what he terms as “misrecognition.” One suffers 
social injustice when the subject’s physical and psychological needs  
are not acknowledged, or when one is not integrated into the ethical  
 
 
32 Ibid., 194. 
33 Robert B. Pippin, “What is the Question for which Hegel’s Theory of Recognition is the 
Answer?,” European Journal of Philosophy 8, no. 2 (2000): 155. 




practices of his/her social group, or when the ability of a subject to 
contribute to society is not realized. Following Hegel and Mead, 
Honneth identifies three spheres of social recognition which, when 
taken together, could be presented as a materialist philosophical 
anthropology with ethical/moral content. Once again, the three 
spheres are care, respect, and self-esteem. 
These three spheres of recognition govern the way we human 
beings encounter each other within a given social formation. Briefly, 
Honneth considers “care” as the most basic form of recognition, an 
acknowledgment of a subject’s basic needs that help in building up 
an adequate attitude required in the initial stages of a subject’s 
integration in society. As an example, the formative years of a child 
are characterized by the sphere of care—the loving and tensional 
relationship between child and parents is the normative ground for 
the development of basic social skills in the child. Meanwhile, what 
is at play in the sphere of “respect” is the principle of universal 
equality. This does not yet refer to the recognition of a fixed 
identity, but, rather, the recognition of the capacity of a subject to 
engage in social customs; such inclusion develops in the subject a 
sense of societal belongingness that further ramifies into a deep 
sense of ethical obligation. Finally, “self-esteem” stems from the 
principle of the individuation of the subject. This kind of 
recognition acknowledges the role that the subject can play within a 
given societal set-up. This last sphere goes beyond the bounds of 
family and peers, thereby allowing the subject to develop a sense of 
self that is not strictly determined by family background or a narrow 
sense of social belongingness.34   
 
34 See Honneth, The Struggle for Recognition, 92–130. For a more detailed discussion of the three 
spheres of recognition as bases for Honneth’s philosophical anthropology, see my “The Ethics of 
Recognition and the Normativity of Social Relations: Some Notes on Axel Honneth’s Materialist 
Philosophical Anthropology,” Suri 1, no. 1 (2012): 15–24. 




As a normative basis for a materialist philosophical anthropology, 
the three spheres of recognition may be used to explain the 
dialectical development of the socialization of the individual subject, 
they illustrate how individual autonomy or personal identity is a 
result of a series of recognitive encounters with other subjects. As 
such, the socialization of the subject develops historically—from the 
basic experience of care to the gradual integration of the subject into 
the society through the experience of social acceptance and the 
acknowledgment of the subject’s individual creative capacities. It is 
important to note that Honneth understands individual autonomy as 
the “practical self-relation” of the subject. “Practical self-relation 
designates the basic conditions of selfhood, which, by allowing for 
the emergence of a sufficiently robust identity, enable the subject to 
engage in interaction with its environments.”35 Honneth claims that 
“the reproduction of social life is governed by the imperative of 
mutual recognition, because one can develop a practical relation-to-
self only when one has learned to view oneself, from the normative 
perspective of one’s partners in interaction, as their social 
addressee.”36 Given this claim, in relation to the normative claim to 
emancipation from slavery and the abolition of social injustice, a 
subject gains full emancipation and the experience of justice only 
when he/she is given the adequate physical and psychological care, 
the freedom to act responsibly, and the chance to develop his/her 
individual potentialities. Basically, the three spheres of recognition 
entail that a socialized subject is able to interact with other subjects 
in a healthy way and, at the same time, recognizes that the basic 
requirement for social cohesion is the development of recognitive  
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relations among social agents. However, another, somewhat 
debatable, feature of Honneth’s recognition theory is that he argues 
that a subject should be able to become conscious, not only of the 
idea of freedom, but also of his/her ability to appropriate freedom. 
This ability requires already a robust sense of moral identity. 
Honneth remarks, “unless one presupposes a certain degree of self-
confidence, legally guaranteed autonomy, and sureness as to the 
value of one's own abilities, it is impossible to imagine successful 
self realization if that is to be understood as a process of realizing, 
without coercion, one's self-chosen life-goals.”37 
Meanwhile, the ethical/moral content of Honneth’s materialist 
philosophical anthropology stems from the intersubjectivist position 
of his theory of recognition, which could be further ramified into 
two ways, namely: 1) the emergence of an ethical subject and 2) the 
ethical implication of the reproduction of social life normatively 
grounded in mutual recognition. Honneth borrows Mead’s solution 
to the problem of individual coordination and the production of 
social life. The intersubjectivist-recognitive process results in the 
emergence of a psychological mechanism through which human 
agents are able to mirror themselves from the perspective of other 
subjects.38 
Ricoeur and the Peaceful Experience of Mutual Recognition 
Ricoeur could be placed among those philosophers who have 
developed a deep sense of aversion towards the classical notion of 
the Cartesian cogito. Like Honneth, Ricoeur’s philosophical 
anthropology is not based on the modern assumption that society is  
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made up of atomistic individuals. The most profound deficit of the 
Cartesian position is that it does not have an adequate response to 
the problem of social or cultural difference and individual 
peculiarities. A society that operates within the framework of 
sameness, as opposed to difference, would more than likely breed 
contempt among social or cultural groups which see themselves as 
being oppressed by the imperative to be the same, chiding their right 
to express or observe their cherished customs and traditions. Social 
injustice is not only experienced by individuals, but also by cultural 
groups; as a matter of fact, a subject often suffers from social 
injustice because of the social group he/she is associated with. This 
is the first premise of Ricoeur’s recognition theory—the recognition, 
not the overcoming, of distinct qualitative differences of individuals 
and cultural groups in society. 
Ricoeur notes in Critique and Conviction: “The term ‘recognition’ 
seems to me much more important than that of ‘identity’ which is 
the focus most of the time of the debate on multiculturalism. In the 
notion of identity there is only the idea of sameness; whereas 
recognition is a concept that directly integrates otherness and allows 
a dialectic of the same and the other. The demand of identity always 
involves something violent with respect to others. On the contrary, 
the search for recognition implies reciprocity.”39 In other words, the 
politics of identity may result in a particular group’s fixated 
conception of itself, which may pathologically result in the bogging 
down of dialogue and mutual recognition as opposed to their 
realization. Therefore, it remains an issue whether, on the basis of 
the claim of identity alone, special extra rights should be readily 
granted to specific individuals or cultural groups on top of basic 
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rights shared collectively by the members of a community.40 This 
issue is somewhat related to what Ricoeur mentioned regarding the 
sense of entitlement of the new unhappy consciousness, for it is 
always possible that special extra rights are not only redundant in 
some situations; they may also be abused at the expense of those 
who are not granted such rights. It is fortunate that Ricoeur’s 
position is nuanced enough. He is not denying the ontological 
importance of identity, but since he understands the situation from 
an ethical standpoint, Ricoeur tends to accentuate the role of mutual 
recognition as paving the way for dialogue. What this role implies is 
that recognition is neither simply the conflation of various social 
groups under one umbrella meta-group nor the cloistering of groups 
becoming islands in themselves destroying the prospect of an 
earnest acknowledgment of differences. Ricoeur’s recognition theory 
explores the prospect of social cohesion that normatively emerges 
out of a principle of universality. This principle of universality is 
precisely the normative basis of dialogue. As such, it is not the kind 
of universality that subsumes differences, thereby cancelling them. 
While it is important, for Ricoeur, that social groups adopt 
assumptions that become the basis for their proclamation of 
legitimation and guidance for practical actions, they should also 
realize that these assumptions are always subject to critique and 
revision. 
Another interesting and powerful feature of Ricoeur’s 
recognition theory is that it draws on his more predominant theory 
of “narrativity,” which is an integral part of his philosophical 
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anthropology.41 In the context of social groups, however, narrativity 
manifests in collective memory. The understanding of the plight of 
cultural groups rests on the proper “translation” of their collective 
memories. Translation, comments Leovino Ma. Garcia, “constitutes 
a paradigm for all exchanges . . . from one culture to another 
culture,” through which “an equivalence without identity” is 
achieved and, as such, “serves the project of a single humanity 
without breaking up the initial plurality.” 42  In this context, the 
process of translation is a phenomenon of sharing and listening to 
stories we learn about the holistic life experiences of people.  
Sharing and listening constitute the narrative dimension of 
recognition. Ricoeur, in “Asserting Personal Capacities and Pleading 
for Mutual Recognition,” identifies the “power to say” and the 
“power to recount” as among the basic capacities of human beings 
(and, we may add, of cultures) which allow them to “produce events 
in society” through “reasoned discourse” and, moreover, allow them 
to become moral or ethical agents, inasmuch as the power to 
recount is the normative foundation of personal and collective 
identity, as actions can be “imputed” to moral agents.43  Ricoeur 
further asserts: “We can then speak of a narrative identity: it is that 
of the plot of a narrative that remains unfinished and open to the 
possibility of being recounted differently, and also of being 
recounted by others.” 44  Therefore, the process of telling a story 
drawn from collective memory contributes to the self-understanding 
of a culture and the development of collective ethical  
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consciousness—which, to my mind, is very similar to the Hegelian 
vision of Sittlichkeit. According to Ricoeur, “Memory exercises two 
functions: it ensures temporal continuity, by allowing us to move 
along the axis of time; it allows us to recognize ourselves and to say 
I, my. History in its turn contributes something other than the 
feeling of belonging to the same field of temporal consciousness, 
through its recourse to documents that have been preserved in a 
material form; this is what enables it to tell in other terms, to tell 
from the point of view of others.”45 Ricoeur, moreover, emphasizes 
the reciprocal character of memory sharing, “as people remember 
events together and interpret them in terms of shared, historical 
events. Remembering together creates the bonds that hold social 
groups together—and just as often keeps groups apart.”46 Ricoeur 
is, however, quick to note that collective memory could be fetishized 
and recommends that even a cultural group’s collective memory 
must be open to revaluation and emendation. In Memory, History, 
Forgetting, the fetishization of memory is referred to as the “misuse 
of memory” or “manipulations of memory” which poisons and, 
thereby, pathologizes “the demand for identity,” rendering the 
clamor for identity ideological and, hence, fragile. 47   This 
fetishization of collective memory could be perhaps avoided 
through a kind of self-reflexivity that ensures that the self-
understanding of a cultural group is always kept in check and avoids 
the pitfall of cultural reification or what has been described above as 
the new unhappy consciousness in the form of the pathological 
sense of entitlement. 
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Collective memory, for Ricoeur, affectively opens a group to a 
kind of cathartic process, which involves the:  
collective memory that is the place of humiliation, of 
demands, of guilt, of celebrations, hence of veneration 
as well as loathing. Here, we need the concept of 
collective memory which the historian critically 
reworks; we need the concept of collective memory in 
order to have a point of application for the critical 
operation of history. In a reciprocal manner, collective 
memory can counterbalance the tendency of history to 
render official a certain state of memory, an ideological 
memory.48  
By recounting the past, especially in front of the oppressor, a cultural 
group enters a dialectical process of catharsis that addresses precisely 
the experience of social injustice and the demand for recognition. The 
healing process ensues from the open expression of sentiment and the 
oppressor’s admittance of guilt, that is to say, “when the enemy is 
finally reconciled with the enemy,” as in the stories of Homer, there 
occurs “a kind of mutual forgiving”49 or a reconciliation wherein each 
party “renounces” personal partiality, “a pardon in which each is truly 
recognized by the other.” 50  As such, the “process of mutual 
recognition occurs in an apology, which recognizes each party as 
guilty and suffering, allows for a reinterpretation of the past, and 
opens the possibility for reconciliation.”51 The reciprocal recognition  
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of suffering is “forgiveness.” The therapeutic process culminates in 
forgiveness—it is the admittance of the group’s experience of 
suffering and the acknowledgment of the oppressor’s apology. 
Ricoeur’s emphasis on the dialectic of apology-forgiveness is actually 
a proposal for a non-retributive justice which gains normative 
strength from a restorative solution for social conflict, that is to say, 
a “peaceful” experience of mutual recognition, as opposed to the 
classical notion of retributive justice (punishment) that Hegel 
mentions in The Philosophy of Right, wherein it is difficult to 
distinguish between retributive justice and vengeance.52 
Nevertheless, Ricoeur admits that the dialectic between apology 
and forgiveness is an enigmatic, if not a confusing, one. In one of 
the last interviews he did with Sorin Antohi, Ricoeur outlines the 
features of his idea of forgiveness. Forgiveness is a personal act 
between persons that goes beyond the bounds of juridical 
institutions, disturbing the established rules of proceduralism. Going 
beyond the procedures of juridical institutions, the logic of 
forgiveness emerges from a “relation of excess” or “super-
abundance.” Moreover, Ricoeur seems to be hinting that the “logic 
of excess” of forgiveness must influence the “logic of equivalence” 
of juridical justice, because “there is in the idea of justice left to its 
own device something that is vindictive, something that is very hard 
to distinguish from vengeance.” Ricoeur suggests that the vindictive 
tendency of justice is tamed by the logic of excess of forgiveness, for 
instance, in the fact that the courts (although this seems to be true 
only in modern democratic societies) assume equal opportunity on 
the part of the accused when his or her spoken defense is considered. 
However, forgiveness, Ricoeur stresses, is not tantamount to  
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“organized forgetting,” otherwise known as “amnesty.” For Ricoeur, 
amnesty given by juridical institutions to the accused robs the plaintiff  
of genuine justice; he also adds that amnesty thwarts the possibility 
for true forgiveness to ever occur, that is to say, no honest and 
lasting reconciliation, both at the level of individual “consciences” 
and the level of the community, is achieved. Put another way, the 
“private world of forgiveness” and the “public world of justice” are 
prevented from interpenetrating each other. For Ricoeur, genuine 
forgiveness does not seek to cancel the evil perpetrated by the 
accused conscience; as a matter of fact, the act of forgiveness is a 
recognition of the suffering caused by the evil act—it is an act of 
memory. In genuine forgiveness, Ricoeur speaks of “appeased 
memory,” that is to say, a recounting of the “evil suffered or 
committed . . . without anger nor prejudice.”53 It is interesting to 
note that Ricoeur also acknowledges the “collective” dimension of 
forgiveness; although he emphasizes the personal dimension of 
forgiveness in order to stress that systematic forgetting, as in 
amnesty, results in further injustice. Nevertheless, he maintains that 
the experience of forgiveness presupposes a community and should 
not be simply relegated to a single person as arbiter.54  
In the context of mutual recognition, say of the sufferer and the 
perpetrator of suffering, forgiveness presupposes “an alterity within 
oneself which can admit the voices of oneself and the other.”55  
Ricoeur writes in Oneself as Another: “. . . the ‘pardon’ resulting from 
the mutual recognition of the two antagonists who admit the limits  
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of their viewpoints and renounce their partiality denotes the 
authentic phenomenon of conscience.”56  This admittance of the 
limits of the biased viewpoints of consciences follows the logic of 
excess, that is, of the super-abundance of generosity that allows a 
plurality of varying voices. In most situations, voices remain 
incompatible, that is to say, the difference of voices is maintained. 
Forgiveness, as mutual recognition, is not the conflation of two or 
more dissenting voices, but, rather, it initiates the breaking down of 
walls, thereby allowing the different voices to speak and be heard. In 
this sense, therefore, the narrative is not singular but plural, and I 
assume that this is true, not only at a personal level, but also, and I 
would stress more importantly, at the multicultural level. In this 
connection, cultural narratives are always incompatible and, as such, 
the experience of social injustice is historical-specific to a particular 
group. Each group has its own story of suffering. Ricoeur says, “I 
always return to the idea of incomparable histories, and 
consequently to the specificity of ethnic and political problematics. 
This is also why the universal, in this domain, cannot be constitutive 
but regulative.”57 The idea of incompatible histories also invokes the 
process of listening. Once more, the adoption of a universal-
regulative dialogical process must be involved where the historical-
specific dimension of a cultural narrative can guide the process. The 
universal-regulative process makes it difficult to generalize 
conclusions which result in the creation of laws and regulations that 
structurally maintain social cohesion. But this is precisely the 
normative claim of recognition—the recognition of difference and 
the possibility of social inclusion that fosters social justice. 
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It was mentioned above that Ricoeur is wary of the character of 
recognition as “struggle” that Hegel and Honneth treat with 
importance. As mentioned, Ricoeur is worried about the tendency  
of struggles to become violent and the tendency of agents, who 
struggle for recognition, to demand for recognition endlessly, 
resulting in the emergence of a new unhappy consciousness that 
assumes a pathological sense of entitlement. In contrast to struggle, 
Ricoeur proposes a “peaceful” alternative: the “economy of the 
gift.”58 “The logic of the exchange of gifts is a logic of reciprocity 
that creates mutuality; it consists in the call to give in return 
contained in the act of giving.” 59  As such, gift giving is not a 
struggling demand for exchange, but, rather, an “invitation” to 
engage in dialogue, that is to say, an invitation to a continuous and 
generous interaction. As an example of a peaceful experience of 
recognition, the economy of the gift is not established through 
juridical institutionalization; however, such practice may already be 
normatively ingrained in a given society. In this kind of recognition, 
struggle is not necessary—it is neither one’s duty to give others gifts 
so that they may feel respected or esteemed, nor is it the right of 
anyone to demand they should receive.60 As such, the power of the 
gift emanates from the logic of excess of generosity—it was not 
demanded, but, nevertheless, it was given. Moreover, the gift giver 
does not measure the probability of a return or response; however, 
if responded to by the recipient, the loop opens up the abundance 
of human interaction. Ricoeur, nevertheless, cautions that, while a 
peaceful experience of mutual recognition may arise via the 
exchange of gifts, we must not expect that a resolution of a dispute  
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ensues right away. The economy of the gift still is essentially 
aporetic, as the social agents involved experience the “tension 
between generosity and obligation.”61   
Some Critical Considerations 
Before I conclude, I suppose some brief critical comments on 
Ricoeur’s critique of the idea of the “struggle for recognition” are 
not out of place. As pointed out above, Ricoeur’s critique zeros on 
Hegel’s description of recognition as a kind of struggle, which was 
then picked up by Honneth to describe the “moral grammar of 
social conflicts” as a “struggle for recognition.” Ricoeur takes issue 
with the idea of struggle because of its tendencies towards violence 
and insatiability, and, for Ricoeur, these tendencies should be tamed 
by peaceful means of achieving mutual recognition, such as, the 
economy of the gift. Any earnest reader will not fail to accept the 
novelty of Ricoeur’s proposal for a peaceful experience of mutual 
recognition and I do agree with him that the economy of the gift is a 
possible means of achieving such peaceful experience. I trust that this 
is actually a welcome supplement to current discussions on the ethics 
of recognition. However, Ricoeur might be too quick, perhaps even 
naïve, to downplay the normative import of struggle in social 
relations. I do not think that by pointing out that struggles end up 
violently and are seemingly insatiable Ricoeur successfully diminishes 
the important normative role of struggle in social conflicts. I am 
inclined to agree with the observation of Arto Laitinen that Ricoeur’s 
worry might not be as well founded as he believes, especially on 
whether struggles are always insatiable. 
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I wish to briefly summarize the points laid down by Laitinen in 
reaction to Ricoeur. Laitinen provides us three reasons why he thinks  
Ricoeur is mistaken on the subject of struggle. First, “any normative 
demand has its conditions of satisfaction built into it.”62 Laitinen 
uses the example of the demand for global gender equality which 
merely demands a global recognition of the basic rights of women at 
the global scale. If the specific conditions for global gender equality 
are satisfied, then the demand has successfully reached its goal, the 
historical struggle then will stop. The demand neither calls for the 
institutionalization of special rights for women, nor the overpowering 
of the male species—it merely demands for equality or equal 
opportunity. A more specific example, perhaps, is the long historical 
struggle to gain the right of suffrage of women, which dates back to 
the ancient times, which was by no measure a “peaceful” struggle. 
Second, “it is not the case that all demands and expectations are 
justified.”63 The demand for global gender equality defeats its purpose 
if the corresponding expectation is the rise of female superiority. I 
could not agree more with Laitinen that “[t]here is no basis for the 
fear that by acknowledging some demands as justified, one should 
somehow then acknowledge all demands as justified.”64 Hence, we 
should find ways to determine justifiable demands from unjustifiable 
demands. Third, “suggesting ‘a state of peace’ would merely serve the 
interests of the ruling group.”65 How is this so? By being serene or 
calm, it is more than likely that the demands of the disenfranchised 
group will not be heard, much less granted. 
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Ricoeur’s attempt to depoliticize the experience of mutual 
recognition compels him to assume that only through a peaceful 
experience of recognition, such as through gift-giving, can disputing  
parties arrive at real, non-violent, mutual recognition. Moreover, 
since he associates struggle with insatiability, it follows that only  
through peaceful means can we arrest the cycle of the clamor for 
recognition. However, Ricoeur also cautions us that a peaceful 
means, such as gift-giving, can only suspend dispute, hence, it may 
or may not yet result in a complete reconciliation. So, what happens 
next when a dispute is suspended but not resolved? There are, at 
least, two possibilities. Either, the interaction ends in a standstill, or 
the disputing parties continue to “struggle” to find ways to 
reconcile.  It is also possible that a standstill is only temporary and 
that the aggrieved party will, once again, demand recognition.  It 
seems to me that the ontology of conflict—to be more precise, a 
situation wherein one party is disrespected or misrecognized—is 
what Ricoeur seemingly downplays in his depoliticized view of 
recognition.  The peaceful alternative of Ricoeur is only normatively 
applicable in some cases wherein the harm done is lesser in degree 
or no harm was done at all. However, in most situations—like in 
cases of conflict resolution, social inclusion, or acceptance of 
identity—struggle is almost always present because, in reality, to 
borrow a hyperbole from Adorno, our lives cannot be lived for we exist 
amidst the wrong state of things. To be less hyperbolic, we live in a world 
wherein even our basic rights as members of modern communities 
are not respected.    
Closing remarks 
In order to bring Honneth and Ricoeur together under the ambit 
of critical theory, I referred to the three normative claims of early 
Frankfurt School critical theory and emphasized the normative force 
of its politico-practical content: emancipation from slavery and the 




abolition of social injustice. I argue that Honneth and Ricoeur meet 
at this politico-practical point, and I say so despite Ricoeur’s 
depoliticization of mutual recognition. From a theoretical vantage 
point, the most obvious affinity between the two are their 
qualitatively similar, but also very different, theories of recognition. 
As we have seen, their emphases are different but they are basically 
informed by the same normative force: the avoidance, possibly 
abolition, of misrecognition. My reading of Honneth brings out a 
materialist philosophical anthropology with ethical content based on 
the three spheres of social recognition. Meanwhile, I pinpointed the 
salient points of Ricoeur’s ethics of recognition—highlighting its 
strengths in the context of reciprocal dialogue, narrativity, cultural 
memory, and the phenomenon of forgiveness. While I do think that 
a common ground between “struggle” and “peaceful dialogue” 
could be gleaned from the above overture to Honneth and Ricoeur, 
I pointed out that the latter’s depoliticized view of recognition 
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